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This phenomenon of "freedom" in the natural world - and indirectly the question of free 
will - is explored using systems-theoretic concepts that link the idea of freedom to ideas 
about autonomy and agency. The focus is on living systems in general, and on living 
systems that have cognitive subsystems more specifically. After touching on the 
relevance to freedom of determinism vs. randomness, the paper examines four types of 
freedom: (i) independence from fixed materiality, (ii) activeness that is unblocked and 
wholistic, (iii) internal rather than external determination, and (iv) regulation by an 
informational subsystem. These types of freedom are not all-or-nothing but matters of 
degree. 
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Introduction 
This paper explores the relevance of some systems theoretic ideas to "freedom" in the 
natural world, and indirectly, to the subject of free will. The systems theorist Stuart 
Kauffman (1998) once posed the question: "what is required of a system for us to say that 
it 'acts on its own behalf?" This paper poses a related question: "what is required of a 
system for us to say that it exhibits 'freedom'?" This question is answered here by an 
abstract look at four types of freedom, related to autonomy and agency, that apply to 
living systems, or more narrowly to complex living systems having cognitive subsystems 
(e.g., human beings). The subject of freedom as a natural phenomenon not only has 
intrinsic interest, but also offers a useful broader context for discussions of free will. 
As a preliminary issue, the paper discusses a "condition of possibility" for freedom, 
namely that the system is partially deterministic and partially random, or, alternatively, is 
completely deterministic but "at the edge of chaos." It then considers four different but 
related types of freedom. It argues that freedom inheres in: 
• non-dependence on fixed matter, and availability of energy under informational 
control; 
• activeness that is not blocked and that reflects the whole - or a central part - of 
the system; 
• determination that is internal rather than external, and that depends on a boundary 
that controls interactions with the environment; 
• regulation by a "modeling" (cognitive) subsystem in which information 
processing is hierarchical and self-referential. 
In all of these, freedom is not all-or-nothing but a matter of degree. 
Determinism and randomness; fuzzy freedom 
Denial of freedom is based on the view that the world is governed by deterministic Jaws. 
If it is, our actions are not free. Denying determinism doesn't solve the problem. If the 
world is random, our actions are also not free, but in a different way. However, 
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randomness allows for a variety of actions needed for freedom, so it removes an obstacle 
posed by determinism. And determinism causally Jinks decision to action and action to 
its effects, so it removes an obstacle posed by randomness (Dennett 2003). Determinism 
and randomness each makes freedom impossible, but each also remedies an impossibility 
implied by the other. 
What about a system that is partially determined and partially random? Such a system 
can have properties absent in systems that are wholly determined or wholly random 
because a whole can have properties different from - even opposite to - those of its parts. 
Freedom might be possible by virtue of an interaction effect between partial determinism 
and partial randomness. For a purely deterministic system, there is a related idea about 
"the edge of chaos." A deterministic system can also have chaotic attractors, where the 
dynamics of the system looks random but is not. Between dynamics that converges on 
fixed points or limit cycles and dynamics that is chaotic - analogous to the extremes of 
determinism and randomness - there is an intermediate regime called "the edge of chaos" 
(EOC), where dynamics both differs from and resembles both extremes. Langton (1991 ), 
Kauffman (1991), and others argue that all "interesting" dynamic phenomena, such as 
universal computation, occur in this regime. Langton also suggests that EOC systems are 
mathematically undecidable, so even though they are deterministic, they can have states 
that cannot be arrived at deterministically. Also, purely deterministic systems can have 
singularities at which the future is not merely unpredictable, but actually undetermined. 
All this does not invoke quantum mechanics, which will not be taken up here, except to 
note that in some of its interpretations quantum theory also harbors a mixture of 
determinism (in the time evolution of the wave function) and non-determinism (in the 
mixtures of states produced by measurement and in the uncertainty relations). 
The point here is twofold: (i) we do not view the world as governed by complete 
determinism and (ii) partial determinism is a condition of possibility for freedom. 
Possibility is not actuality, but freedom as an actuality - indeed, several types of freedom 
- emerges in the biological realm. In the following sections, four types of freedom in this 
realm are discussed. These freedoms involve autonomy and agency, and are matters of 
degree. In set theory terminology, the set of free actions and the set of unfree actions are 
not taken to be "crisp" sets, where the question is whether the first set is empty. Instead, 
these sets are viewed as fuzzy (Zadeh 1965), which allows membership in a set to be not 
only 0 or 1, but any value in between. An action can have membership in the set "free" 
of .1 or .5 or .9. What is important is not the precise value but the fact that some actions 
are freer than others, depending on the nature of the system, on external and internal 
conditions, and the type of freedom under discussion. 
1. Liberation from fixed substance; available energy 
Some systems construct and maintain themselves, i.e., exhibit "autopoiesis" (self-
making) (Maturana & Varela 1980). They do so by informational control over a matter-
energy flux through the system. Control operates (a) via a boundary that lets only some 
forms of matter-energy into the system; and (b) via metabolic processes that constantly 
reconstruct the system and, in more complex systems, reproduce it. In autopoietic 
systems, identity is not material but informational, so the system, although materially 
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instantiated, is free from dependence upon specific and.fixed materiality. For Jonas 
( 1966) metabolism is thus the first appearance of freedom in the natural world, a freedom 
related to autonomy and also inextricably tied to vulnerability. 
To have this type of freedom, self-construction and self-maintenance require the 
unceasing importing of matter-energy, hence the vulnerability. But through this 
importing, the system can acquire internal reservoirs of (matter and) energy. Bateson 
(1979) refers to this as having "collateral energy," and gives the example that a kicked 
dog jumps not from the force of the kick, but from its own energy sources. The dog's 
jump is admittedly triggered by the external disturbance, but the point is that the dog has 
internal energy resources usable for active and intentional purposes. Metabolism thus 
brings freedom not only in liberation from fixed substance, but in provision of energy for 
system-directed action. 
Use of this energy is governed by internal information and guided by some implicit or 
explicit representation of the system's "interests," in decision- and game-theoretic terms, 
"utility"(von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). Freedom, in the sense of agency, thus 
depends on particular relationships between matter (the physical instantiation of the 
system), energy (its capacity to change internally and also to affect its environment), 
information (governing of this capacity), and utility (the implicit or explicit goals that 
guide such governance). In Aristotelian terms, matter is material cause, energy is 
efficient cause, information is formal cause, and utility is final cause. Agency - and 
freedom - require a particular harmony among these four causes. 
2. Activity and wholeness 
Human action is often conceived of as driven by desire, with freedom implying the 
absence of obstacles (either internal or external) to the fulfillment of desire. Bennett's 
( 1966) "systematics" speaks of desire and what opposes it in the general terms of "active" 
and "passive" forces. In Newtonian terms, these forces are action and reaction; in 
Hegelian (actually Fichtean) terms, thesis and antithesis; in Peircian (1991) terms, 
firstness and secondness. Two forces locked in opposition leave no room for freedom, 
but an added third force may allow such a possibility. Systematics defines the "triad" as 
including these forces: active (affirming), passive (denying, receptive), and neutralizing 
·(reconciling, mediating), labeled 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Bennett considers the six 
permutations, 123, 132, 213, 231, 312, 321, where 123 roughly means 1 is linked to 2 
which is linked to 3, and gives each triad a different meaning.· He interprets 321 as 
"freedom" in the following sense: the reconciling factor (3) neutralizes the denying factor 
(2) in advance, removing it as an obstacle, leaving the active force (1) free to manifest 
without opposition. Freedom in this sense is unblocked activeness. 
1, 2, and 3 could be correlated with energy, matter, and information, respectively, and 
321 exemplified by metabolism, where information (enzymes) acts on matter (molecules 
of food) to release energy (ATP), then available for cellular processes. Other examples 
can be given where information (3) triggers a system that is poised to act by removing 
that which blocks action (2), allowing the system to actively use its available energy (1 ). 
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Freedom requires not only unblocked activeness, but also wholeness. To be maximally 
free, action must reflect the whole of the system. If it arises from only part of the system, 
the rest of the system is passively subject to the consequences of the action and is unfree. 
This is relevant to free will because there are reasons to doubt that the psyche has 
enduring unity. Our decisions and actions are made by parts that claim to represent the 
whole. Each part, governed by its own utility, disregards negative externalities to other 
parts. If the system is united, however, multiple utilities are aggregated into some unitary 
utility, or an order of priority is established, or one utility is selected as the objective with 
the others only providing constraints on the optimization. Under these conditions, agency 
is more free because it is more whole. But no system is a totally integrated whole, so 
what is needed is only that some central aspect of the system be unitary. 
Freedom requires not only unity but multiplicity, namely multiple options available to a 
unitary decision maker. Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety (1956) illustrates this idea by 
describing a necessary condition for successful regulation against disturbances from the 
environment. The law states that successful regulation requires a regulator that chooses 
deterministically an effective response for any particular disturbance. This illustrates the 
above assertion that determinism is required for freedom because decisions need to 
reliably produce actions that have reliable consequences. But Ashby's Law applies only 
to certain regulators. Successful regulation needn't always require deterministic action: 
in zero sum games without saddle points, optimal action is a mixed maximin strategy in 
which actions are selected randomly (but are governed by fixed probabilities). 
3. System and environment 
The environment delimits the system, imposes constraints, and presents disturbances. The 
impacts of the environment depend on the degree to which the system is open or closed. 
Closedness can shield the system from external disorder that threatens its internal order 
and from external order that diminishes its autonomy. Openness can protect the system 
from internal disorder produced entropically and internal order that reduces necessary 
variety. But everything depends on when, to what degree, and towards what is the 
system open or closed. Control of the boundary - a feature of autopoiesis - is a condition 
of possibility for viability and freedom. 
There are two views of how systems are constituted: an open systems symmetric view in 
which a system is both internal structure and external function, and a closed systems 
asymmetric view in which structure is what the system is (internally) and function is what 
it does (externally). For complex systems, the asymmetric view is more appropriate. For 
a system to be free, internal determination must be greater than external determination. 
Freedom, in this sense, means being causa sui, the cause of oneself. While there is no 
escape from environmental constraint, disturbance, and dependence, freedom means self-
determination, not other-determination, autonomy, not heteronomy. But autonomy is a 
matter of degree. 
This is the deep significance of autopoiesis. In so far as the system is governed by 
internal information, it is "closed under causal entailment" (Rosen 1991 ). It is the main 
cause of itself - or at least of its core identity. This does not mean the system is immune 
to external influences, but even when internal specifications for self-construction are 
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influenced by external conditions, how these conditions modify the specifications is itself 
(at least partially) internally specified. 
Moreover the system can affect which environment it is in. Some enviroJ]ments impose 
more constraints or more benign constraints than others. Freedom is not the possibility of 
escaping constraint altogether, but participating in determining which constraints the 
system will come under. For example, locomotion allows animals some choice of 
environment; this freedom in space is a major evolutionary advance. In more complex 
animals that have "modeling subsystems," systems can gain freedom also in time, as it 
were, by extending the present moment through modeling to encompass past and future. 
A system can satisfy external constraints before they drastically limit freedom of action. 
A horse tied to a moving cart gains freedom by running with the cart and avoids being 
dragged by it. Beyond such accommodation to environmental demand, there is the 
possibility also of modifying the environment to suit the system. Freedom from 
determination by the environment is thus achievable in multiple ways: by selecting one's 
environment, by accepting it or adapting to it, or by changing it. 
Freedom means reducing control by the environment that is not only direct, via external 
limitation or compulsion, but also indirect. The environment (either other systems that it 
contains or the environment as a suprasystem) colonizes the system by establishing 
"beachheads" within it. From one perspective, this is not as restrictive as direct external 
control, since foreign influences can in principle come under internal control. But from 
another perspective, it is potentially more harmful, because foreign implants can escape 
detection. In its more benign impacts, the environment simply causes the system to adapt 
or co-determines its "phenotype," without undermining the system's organizing principle. 
But for its less benign impacts, the word "colonization" is apt: the system is aliem~ted 
from its nature and acts on behalf of the environment rather than itself. 
4. The modeling subsystem· 
Freedom from external control is necessary but not sufficient, since a system can also be 
controlled by internal forces. A second liberation is needed from internal control; more 
precisely, from internal aspects not deriving from some internal "essence" or organizing 
principle. Even essence might be transcended - one could call this a third liberation - but 
a shift of locus of control from the outside to an inner center is already a major 
achievement. 
In complex adaptive systems, more particularly higher organisms, the informational 
domain includes a "modeling subsystem" (i.e., the nervous system, perhaps also the 
endocrine and immune systems) that models and controls the system and its interaction 
with the environment, and - reflexively - even models itself. Through this subsystem, 
systems acquire the capacity for rationality. Some views of free will ascribe freedom to 
this capacity, arguing that rational action is different from causal determinism. Related to 
this is the fact that decision theory and game theory describe rational action as dependent 
on utility and the suitability of means to ends. This is a final cause explanation that may 
seem to differ from the efficient cause explanation that is normative for physics, reflected 
in its use of differential equations. But differential equations actually implicitly include 
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also final cause!;, namely the attractors that the dynamics lead to (that is why they are 
called attractors), and game theory can also employ differential equations, in which 
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action depends on differences of utility. One might object that utility is not a category for 
physics, where causes are expressed in terms of energy, but utility is an emergent that can 
be adequately expressed in the language of physics. So agency and causality only appear 
to be radically different, which may suggest that they are different representations of a 
single reality. 
Since the modeling subsystem is central to the system, the question of the system's 
freedom becomes the question of the modeling subsystem's freedom. An absence of 
freedom is suggested by the automatism of many of its functions. To the extent that the 
modeling subsystem is on auto-pilot and the reactions triggered in it are automatic and 
involuntary, this subsystem is unfree in being determined. To the extent that reactions do 
not reflect a central and enduring principle, but are contingent upon highly variable 
internal or external factors, this subsystem is unfree in being random. But to the extent 
that automatic functioning is partially determined and partially random, it has the 
possibility of creativity and, in a certain sense, freedom. (In any case, it is free at least in 
the sense that determination is internal.) 
Mental activity rises above automatism when it generates subjective experience of 
sensations, emotions, and thoughts, here called "sensitivity," a capacity unavailable to 
robots or zombies. Sensitivity in turn is transcended in "consciousness," in which 
experience is associated with an organized and unified "self." This view, taken from 
Bennett (1961), proposes three levels of mental function - automatic, sensitive, and 
conscious - where above a level of hidden activity, there is awareness of external and 
internal information inputs, and above that a sense of "I" associated with this experience 
and the possibility ofdirecting attention. Consciousness expands sensitivity by lowering 
the threshold between it and what lies beneath it; this increases the possibility of freedom 
by allowing impulses to be vetoed, opening up additional choices of action, and enabling 
deliberation. 
The partial independence of consciousness from sensitivity is like a transmission 
disengaged by a clutch. In this decoupling, impressions are brought into view and 
separated to some extent from the internal or external action that they normally activate. 
If this energy of sensitivity is not too strong, it need not lead to habitual action or to the 
completion of action already incipient; the system is thus freer. If awareness is fast 
enough, what normally discharges impulsively can even be diverted into other channels, 
augmenting available energy. But such alchemy is rare; normally, sensitivity and 
consciousness are stuck together, without a gap that might allow freedom from impulse 
or awareness of factors distant from immediate impressions. Consciousness needs to be 
pried away from sensitivity also to prevent the complete capture of attention by either 
external or internal impressions. A condition of possibility of freedom for the modeling 
subsystem is mobility of attention. 
The modeling subsystem not only models the system's interaction with the environment 
and the (rest of the) system, but also itself. Self-reference has already been noted as a 
source of freedom in autopoiesis and agency. The modeling subsystem offers another 
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kind of freedom through self-reference: in the fuller perception of the energies operating 
within it, the subsystem, and the system as a whole, is freer. Famously, self-reference 
generates paradox. In Godel's undecidability theorem, self-reference allows the 
existence of a well-formed formula_that is meaningful but undecidable; moreover this 
formula, despite being undecidable, is true. Decidability in formal systems corresponds 
to causal determinism in physical systems. It is conceivable that self-reference allows the 
operation of the mind to be causa sui (Zwick 2007) - in some sense and to some degree. 
This is the highest form of freedom imagined in this paper. 
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